[The original spaciality of the body itself: phenomenology and neurosciences].
The phenomenological tradition stands opposed to contemporary cognitive science in this, that so far from being a mere thing in the physical world, a thing whose mind would contain some mental representation, the lived body is constituted in its sense of being for the subject by being used and actively appropriated by this self-same subject, as agent. Though not already generally acknowledged, there are important similarities between this conception and one, which emerges from the literature of brain cartography over the last twenty years, that of a functional morphogenetic neurodynamics, induced and modulated by experience in a relatively autonomous way, in relation both to the anatomic structures of the body, as well as the cytoarchitectonic frontiers of brain tissue. Taking advantage of the latter similarities, neuroscientific data can be employed to confirm the Husserlian theory of constitution against the attempts on the part of cognitive science to discredit it, and this whether we are talking about its later modification at the hands of Merleau-Ponty or the original version, which is that of a subjective (transcendental) auto-constitution of the lived body on the basis of the practico-kinaesthetic experience of <<I move my body>>.
Petit
Jean-Luc
JL
D019336:Cognitive Science / Q000266:history*; D049673:History, 20th Century; D018594:Human Body; D006801:Humans; D009488:Neurosciences / Q000266:history