Suppositions, extensionality, and conditionals: a critique of the mental model theory of Johnson-Laird And Byrne (2002).
P. N. Johnson-Laird and R. M. J. Byrne proposed an influential theory of conditionals in which mental models represent logical possibilities and inferences are drawn from the extensions of possibilities that are used to represent conditionals. In this article, the authors argue that the extensional semantics underlying this theory is equivalent to that of the material, truth-functional conditional, at least for what they term "basic" conditionals, concerning arbitrary problem content. On the basis of both logical argument and psychological evidence, the authors propose that this approach is fundamentally mistaken and that conditionals must be viewed within a suppositional theory based on what philosophical logicians call the Ramsey test. The Johnson-Laird and Byrne theory is critically examined with respect to its account of basic conditionals, nonbasic conditionals, and counterfactuals.
Evans
Jonathan St B T
JS
Centre for Thinking and Language, School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, England. jevans@plymouth.ac.uk
Over
David E
DE
Handley
Simon J
SJ
D003071:Cognition; D006801:Humans; D007802:Language; D008128:Logic; D011582:Psychological Theory