Oil market power and United States national security.
It is widely believed that an oil weapon could impose scarcity upon the United States. Impending resource exhaustion is thought to exacerbate this threat. However, threat seems implausible when we consider strategic deficits of prospective weapon users and the improbability of impending resource exhaustion. Here, we explore a hypothesis relating oil to national security under a different assumption, abundance. We suggest that an oil cartel exerts market power to keep abundance at bay, commanding monopoly rents [or wealth transfers (wt)] that underwrite security threats. We then compare security threats attributed to the oil weapon to those that may arise from market power. We first reexamine whether oil is abundant or scarce by reviewing current development data, then we estimate a competitive price for oil. From this, we derive wt(2004) collections by Persian Gulf states approximately USD $132-178 x 10(9). We find that wt and the behavior of states collecting it interact to actuate security threats. Threats underwritten by wt are (i) the potential for emergence of a Persian Gulf superpower and (ii) terrorism. It is therefore oil market power, not oil per se, that actuates threats. We also describe a paradox in the relation of market power to the United States' defense doctrine of force projection to preempt a Gulf superpower. Because the superpower threat derives from wt, force alone cannot preempt it. A further paradox is that because foreign policy is premised on oil weapon fear, market power is appeased. Threats thereby grow unimpeded.
Stern
Roger
R
Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering, Johns Hopkins University, 313 Ames Hall, 3400 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218, USA.