Unpredictability induced by unfocused games in evolutionary game dynamics.
Evolutionary game theory is a basis of replicator systems and has applications ranging from animal behavior and human language to ecosystems and other hierarchical network systems. Most studies in evolutionary game dynamics have focused on a single game, but, in many situations, we see that many games are played simultaneously. We construct a replicator equation with plural games by assuming that a reward of a player is a simple summation of the reward of each game. Even if the numbers of the strategies of the games are different, its dynamics can be described in one replicator equation. We here show that when players play several games at the same time, the fate of a single game cannot be determined without knowing the structures of the whole other games. The most absorbing fact is that even if a single game has a ESS (evolutionary stable strategy), the relative frequencies of strategies in the game does not always converge to the ESS point when other games are played simultaneously.
Hashimoto
Koh
K
Department of Applied Physics, Graduate School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo Hongo 7-3-1, Bunkyo-ku, 113-8656, Japan. hasimoto@zzz.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp
D000818:Animals; D005075:Biological Evolution; D017753:Ecosystem; D005716:Game Theory; D008954:Models, Biological; D012201:Reward