Game relativity: how context influences strategic decision making.
Existing models of strategic decision making typically assume that only the attributes of the currently played game need be considered when reaching a decision. The results presented in this article demonstrate that the so-called "co-operativeness" of the previously played prisoner's dilemma games influence choices and predictions in the current prisoner's dilemma game, which suggests that games are not considered independently. These effects involved reinforcement-based assimilation to the previous choices and also a perceptual contrast of the present game with preceding games, depending on the range and the rank of their co-operativeness. A. Parducci's (1965) range frequency theory and H. Helson's (1964) adaptation level theory are plausible theories of relative judgment of magnitude information, which could provide an account of these context effects.
Vlaev
Ivo
I
Department of Psychology, University College London, London, United Kingdom. i.vlaev@ucl.ac.uk
Chater
Nick
N
D001245:Association Learning; D002755:Choice Behavior; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D003657:Decision Making; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D007206:Individuality; D033182:Intention; D007398:Interpersonal Relations; D007600:Judgment; D009042:Motivation; D011337:Probability Learning; D011340:Problem Solving; D011601:Psychophysics; D012054:Reinforcement, Psychology; D012306:Risk