Why g is not an adaptation: a comment on Kanazawa (2004).
In S. Kanazawa's evolutionary theory of general intelligence (g), g is presented as a species-typical information-processing mechanism. This conceptualization of g departs radically from the accepted conceptualization of g as a source of individual differences that is manifest in the positive manifold. Kanazawa's theory is thus problematic in the sense that it concerns a purely hypothetical, and empirically unsupported, conceptualization of g. The authors argue that an evolutionary account of g should address it as a source of individual differences--that is, in a manner that is consistent with the empirical support for g.
Borsboom
Denny
D
Department of Psychology.
Dolan
Conor V
CV
Department of Psychology.
D000223:Adaptation, Psychological; D000818:Animals; D005075:Biological Evolution; D003210:Concept Formation; D006801:Humans; D007206:Individuality; D007360:Intelligence; D008606:Mental Processes; D011582:Psychological Theory; D012931:Social Environment; D013045:Species Specificity