Reproductive freedom and risk.
It is widely recognized that one person's freedom may be limited to prevent harm to another (non-consenting) person. It is curious, therefore, that where a right to reproductive freedom is recognized, there is considerable reticence to limit or override it in cases where reproduction harms those people who are brought into existence. I argue that this is inappropriate. If there should be no right to inflict a harm in non-reproductive contexts then there should be no right to inflict an equivalent harm in reproductive contexts. Because of the long history of bias and arbitrary discrimination in curtailments of reproductive freedom, I suggest how bias might be avoided in deciding how severe a harm must be to defeat a right to reproductive freedom.
Benatar
David
D
Philosophy Department, University of Cape Town, South Africa. dbenatar@humanities.uct.ac.za
D001519:Behavior / Q000502:physiology*; D002648:Child; D005260:Female; D005610:Freedom; D006806:Human Rights; D006801:Humans; D008297:Male; D011287:Prejudice; D012098:Reproduction / Q000502:physiology*