Explanatory limitations of cognitive-developmental approaches to morality.
In response to Gibbs' defense of neo-Kohlbergian models of morality, the authors question whether revisions in Kohlberg's model constitute a coherent refinement of the cognitive-developmental approach. The authors argue that neo-Kohlbergian measures of moral development assess an aspect of morality (the most sophisticated forms of moral reasoning available to people) that plays a relatively minor role in determining the moral judgments and behavioral decisions people make in their everyday lives. Attempts to conceptualize stages as schema and to redefine moral decision-making in terms of automaticity will not solve these problems. Flexibility is an important aspect of moral maturity. Observed relations between stages of moral development and various forms of social conduct do not establish that the structures of moral reasoning that define stages of moral development exert a significant causal impact on moral behavior. Although cognitive-developmental approaches are equipped to account for some aspects of morality, a more general framework that organizes the insights from other theoretical approaches is needed.
Krebs
Dennis L
DL
Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada. krebs@sfu.ca
Denton
Kathy
K
D001332:Automatism; D003071:Cognition; D003415:Crime; D006801:Humans; D009014:Morals; D011582:Psychological Theory; D012919:Social Behavior