Reproductive cloning and arguments from potential.
The possibility of human reproductive cloning has led some bioethicists to suggest that potentiality-based arguments for fetal moral status become untenable, as such arguments would be committed to making the implausible claim that any adult somatic cell is itself a potential person. In this article I defend potentiality-based arguments for fetal moral status against such a reductio. Starting from the widely-held claim that the maintenance of numerical identity throughout successive changes places constraints on what a given entity can plausibly be said to have the potential to become, I argue that the cell reprogramming that takes place in reproductive cloning is such that it produces a new individual, and so adult somatic cells cannot be potential persons.
Oakley
Justin
J
Centre for Human Bioethics, Monash University, Australia.
D002454:Cell Differentiation / Q000235:genetics*; D019976:Cloning, Organism; D004622:Embryo, Mammalian / Q000166:cytology; D026689:Ethical Analysis; D005333:Fetus / Q000166:cytology; D006801:Humans; D007206:Individuality; D028681:Moral Obligations; D053652:Nuclear Transfer Techniques; D028723:Personhood; D010684:Philosophy; D012098:Reproduction; D027724:Reproductive Techniques, Assisted