title: Dynamic-persistence of cooperation in public good games when group size is dynamic.
abstract: The evolution of cooperation is possible with a simple model of a population of agents that can move between groups. The agents play public good games within their group. The relative fitness of individuals within the whole population affects their number of offspring. Groups of cooperators evolve but over time are invaded by defectors which eventually results in the group's extinction. However, for small levels of migration and mutation, high levels of cooperation evolve at the population level. Thus, evolution of cooperation based on individual fitness without kin selection, indirect or direct reciprocity is possible. We provide an analysis of the parameters that affect cooperation, and describe the dynamics and distribution of population sizes over time.
authors.affiliation: School of Human Evolution and Social Change and School of Computing and Informatics, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-2402, USA. Marco.Janssen@asu.edu
authors.forename: Marco A
authors.initials: MA
authors.lastname: Janssen
authors.forename: Robert L
authors.initials: RL
authors.lastname: Goldstone
mesh_terms: D000818:Animals; D005075:Biological Evolution; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D006126:Group Processes; D008954:Models, Biological; D009154:Mutation; D011156:Population Density; D011157:Population Dynamics