Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility.
Recent developments in neuroscience raise the worry that understanding how brains cause behavior will undermine our views about free will and, consequently, about moral responsibility. The potential ethical consequences of such a result are sweeping. I provide three reasons to think that these worries seemingly inspired by neuroscience are misplaced. First, problems for common-sense notions of freedom exist independently of neuroscientific advances. Second, neuroscience is not in a position to undermine our intuitive notions. Third, recent empirical studies suggest that even if people do misconstrue neuroscientific results as relevant to our notion of freedom, our judgments of moral responsibility will remain largely unaffected. These considerations suggest that neuroethical concerns about challenges to our conception of freedom are misguided.
Roskies
Adina
A
Department of Philosophy, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755, USA. adina.roskies@dartmouth.edu
D001921:Brain / Q000502:physiology; D003416:Criminal Law; D004644:Emotions / Q000502:physiology; D007389:Internal-External Control; D019545:Intuition / Q000502:physiology; D007600:Judgment / Q000502:physiology; D008678:Metaphysics; D009014:Morals; D009488:Neurosciences; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D010684:Philosophy; D012069:Religion and Psychology; D012941:Social Responsibility