Cooperation in the noisy case: Prisoner's dilemma game on two types of regular random graphs.
We have studied an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with players located on two types of random regular graphs with a degree of 4. The analysis is focused on the effects of payoffs and noise (temperature) on the maintenance of cooperation. When varying the noise level and/or the highest payoff, the system exhibits a second-order phase transition from a mixed state of cooperators and defectors to an absorbing state where only defectors remain alive. For the random regular graph (and Bethe lattice) the behavior of the system is similar to those found previously on the square lattice with nearest neighbor interactions, although the measure of cooperation is enhanced by the absence of loops in the connectivity structure. For low noise the optimal connectivity structure is built up from randomly connected triangles.
Vukov
Jeromos
J
Department of Biological Physics, Eötvös University, H-1117 Budapest, Pázmány Péter sétány 1/A, Hungary.
Szabó
György
G
Szolnoki
Attila
A