Experimentation on humans and nonhumans.
In this article, I argue that it is wrong to conduct any experiment on a nonhuman which we would regard as immoral were it to be conducted on a human, because such experimentation violates the basic moral rights of sentient beings. After distinguishing the rights approach from the utilitarian approach, I delineate basic concepts. I then raise the classic "argument from marginal cases" against those who support experimentation on nonhumans but not on humans. After next replying to six important objections against that argument, I contend that moral agents are logically required to accord basic moral rights to every sentient being. I conclude by providing criteria for distinguishing ethical from unethical experimentation.
Pluhar
Evelyn B
EB
Penn State Fayette, The Eberly Campus, One University Drive, P.O. Box 519, Uniontown, PA 15401, USA. exp5@psu.edu
D032761:Animal Experimentation / Q000941:ethics*; D000827:Animal Welfare; D000818:Animals; D026688:Bioethical Issues; D035843:Biomedical Research; D028663:Ethical Theory; D015186:Hominidae; D040821:Human Characteristics; D006805:Human Experimentation / Q000941:ethics*; D006806:Human Rights; D006801:Humans; D028723:Personhood; D035842:Research Subjects; D026712:Value of Life; D028722:Virtues