Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation.
We study stochastic game dynamics in finite populations. To this end we extend the classical Moran process to incorporate frequency-dependent selection and mutation. For 2 x 2 games, we give a complete analysis of the long-run behavior when mutation rates are small. For 3 x 3 coordination games, we provide a simple rule to determine which strategy will be selected in large populations. The expected motion in our model resembles the standard replicator dynamics when the population is large, but is qualitatively different when the population is small. Our analysis shows that even in large finite populations the behavior of a replicator-like system can be different from that of the standard replicator dynamics. As an application, we consider selective language dynamics. We determine which language will be spoken in finite large populations. The results have an intuitive interpretation but would not be expected from an analysis of the replicator dynamics.
Fudenberg
Drew
D
Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. dfudenberg@harvard.edu
Nowak
Martin A
MA
Taylor
Christine
C
Imhof
Lorens A
LA
D005075:Biological Evolution; D003627:Data Interpretation, Statistical; D005716:Game Theory; D014644:Genetic Variation / Q000235:genetics; D005828:Genetics, Population; D006801:Humans; D008390:Markov Chains; D008957:Models, Genetic; D009154:Mutation / Q000235:genetics*; D010641:Phenotype; D011156:Population Density; D011157:Population Dynamics; D011336:Probability; D012306:Risk; D012641:Selection, Genetic; D012660:Semantics; D013269:Stochastic Processes