title: How something can be said about telling more than we can know: on choice blindness and introspection.
abstract: The legacy of Nisbett and Wilson's classic article, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes (1977), is mixed. It is perhaps the most cited article in the recent history of consciousness studies, yet no empirical research program currently exists that continues the work presented in the article. To remedy this, we have introduced an experimental paradigm we call choice blindness [Johansson, P., Hall, L., Sikström, S., & Olsson, A. (2005). Failure to detect mismatches between intention and outcome in a simple decision task. Science, 310(5745), 116-119.]. In the choice blindness paradigm participants fail to notice mismatches between their intended choice and the outcome they are presented with, while nevertheless offering introspectively derived reasons for why they chose the way they did. In this article, we use word-frequency and latent semantic analysis (LSA) to investigate a corpus of introspective reports collected within the choice blindness paradigm. We contrast the introspective reasons given in non-manipulated vs. manipulated trials, but find very few differences between these two groups of reports.
authors.affiliation: Lund University Cognitive Science (LUCS), Lund University, Kungshuset, Lundagård, 222 22 Lund, Sweden.
authors.forename: Petter
authors.initials: P
authors.lastname: Johansson
authors.forename: Lars
authors.initials: L
authors.lastname: Hall
authors.forename: Sverker
authors.initials: S
authors.lastname: Sikström
authors.forename: Betty
authors.initials: B
authors.lastname: Tärning
authors.forename: Andreas
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Lind
mesh_terms: D000339:Affect; D002755:Choice Behavior; D003243:Consciousness; D006801:Humans; D012660:Semantics; D014825:Vocabulary