Organisms as natural purposes: the contemporary evolutionary perspective.
Kant's conception of organisms as natural purposes raises a challenge to the adequacy of mechanistic explanation in biology. Certain features of organisms appear to be inexplicable by appeal to mechanical law alone. Some biological phenomena, it seems, can only be accounted for teleologically. Contemporary evolutionary biology has by and large ignored this challenge. It is widely held that Darwin's theory of natural selection gives us an adequate, wholly mechanical account of the nature of organisms. In contemporary biology, the category of the organism plays virtually no explanatory role. Contemporary evolutionary biology is a science of sub-organismal entities-replicators. I argue that recent advances in developmental biology demonstrate the inadequacy of sub-organismal mechanism. The category of the organism, construed as a 'natural purpose' should play an ineliminable role in explaining ontogenetic development and adaptive evolution. According to Kant the natural purposiveness of organisms cannot be demonstrated to be an objective principle in nature, nor can purposiveness figure in genuine explain. I attempt to argue, by appeal to recent work on self-organization, that the purposiveness of organisms is a natural phenomenon, and, by appeal to the apparatus of invariance explanation, that biological purposiveness provides genuine, ineliminable biological explanations.
Walsh
D M
DM
Department of Philosophy and Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Toronto, 91 Charles Street West, Toronto M5S 1K7, Canada. denis.walsh@utoronto.ca
D005075:Biological Evolution; D001690:Biological Science Disciplines / Q000266:history*; D028663:Ethical Theory / Q000266:history*; D049671:History, 18th Century; D006801:Humans; D019563:Mechanics; D008678:Metaphysics / Q000266:history; D010811:Natural Science Disciplines / Q000266:history*; D010684:Philosophy / Q000266:history*