Kant on biological teleology: Towards a two-level interpretation.
According to Kant's Critique of the power of judgment, teleological considerations are unavoidable for conceptualizing organisms. Does this mean that teleology is more than merely heuristic? Kant stresses the regulative status of teleological attributions, but sometimes he seems to treat teleology as a constitutive condition for biology. To clarify this issue, the concept of natural purpose and its role for biology are examined. I suggest that the concept serves an identificatory function: it singles out objects as natural purposes, whereby the special science of biology is constituted. This relative constitutivity of teleology is explicated by means of a distinction of levels: on the object level of biological science, teleology is taken as constitutive, though it is merely regulative on the philosophical meta level. This distinction also concerns the place of Aristotelian teleology in Kant: on the object level, the Aristotelian view is accepted, whereas on the meta level, an agnostic stance is taken concerning teleology.
Quarfood
Marcel
M
Department of Media, Art and Philosophy, Södertörn University College, SE-141 89 Huddinge, Sweden. marcel.quarfood@sh.se
D001690:Biological Science Disciplines / Q000266:history*; D028663:Ethical Theory / Q000266:history*; D049673:History, 20th Century; D006801:Humans; D010811:Natural Science Disciplines / Q000266:history*; D010684:Philosophy / Q000266:history*