title: Dagher redux: searching for the missing pieces.
abstract: The most relevant question for any joint venture is, when does the relationship become a jointventure and not simply a price-fixing cartel? With respect to this question, this Article juxtaposes Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S. Ct. 1276 (2006), against years of contrary precedent. In Dagher, the Court altered the seemingly settled foundation of antitrust law by changing its view on past holdings and abandoning the ancillary effects doctrine. The Article provides an outline of key holdings prior to Dagher, as well as a discussion of the issues that can arise as joint ventures are formed. Additionally, the authors examine how the decision altered the foundation of joint venture law in the United States. In particular, the Article exposes several important antitrust concerns relating to joint ventures that the Supreme Court did not address in Dagher. Perhaps the most perplexing issue of Dagher is whether the venture at issue would have survived analysis under the Federal Trade Commission's "continuum" approach.
authors.affiliation: Epstein Becker & Green, P.C.
authors.forename: William
authors.initials: W
authors.lastname: Kopit
authors.forename: Patricia
authors.initials: P
authors.lastname: Wagner
mesh_terms: D016363:Antitrust Laws; D009935:Organizational Affiliation / Q000191:economics / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence* / Q000458:organization & administration; D014481:United States