Experimental implementation of non-Gaussian attacks on a continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution system.
An intercept-resend attack on a continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution protocol is investigated experimentally. By varying the interception fraction, one can implement a family of attacks where the eavesdropper totally controls the channel parameters. In general, such attacks add excess noise in the channel, and may also result in non-Gaussian output distributions. We implement and characterize the measurements needed to detect these attacks, and evaluate experimentally the information rates available to the legitimate users and the eavesdropper. The results are consistent with the optimality of Gaussian attacks resulting from the security proofs.
Lodewyck
Jérôme
J
Thales Research and Technologies, RD 128, 91767 Palaiseau Cedex, France.
Debuisschert
Thierry
T
García-Patrón
Raúl
R
Tualle-Brouri
Rosa
R
Cerf
Nicolas J
NJ
Grangier
Philippe
P