Long-distance decoy-state quantum key distribution in optical fiber.
The theoretical existence of photon-number-splitting attacks creates a security loophole for most quantum key distribution (QKD) demonstrations that use a highly attenuated laser source. Using ultralow-noise, high-efficiency transition-edge sensor photodetectors, we have implemented the first version of a decoy-state protocol that incorporates finite statistics without the use of Gaussian approximations in a one-way QKD system, enabling the creation of secure keys immune to photon-number-splitting attacks and highly resistant to Trojan horse attacks over 107 km of optical fiber.
Rosenberg
Danna
D
Applied Modern Physics, MS D454, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545, USA.
Harrington
Jim W
JW
Rice
Patrick R
PR
Hiskett
Philip A
PA
Peterson
Charles G
CG
Hughes
Richard J
RJ
Lita
Adriana E
AE
Nam
Sae Woo
SW
Nordholt
Jane E
JE