Empirical study on voting power in participatory forest planning.
Multicriteria decision support systems are applied in natural resource management in order to clarify the planning process for the stakeholders, to make all available information usable and all objectives manageable. Especially when the public is involved in planning, the decision support system should be easy to comprehend, transparent and fair. Social choice theory has recently been applied to group decision-making in natural resources management to accomplish these objectives. Although voting forms the basis of democracy, and is usually taken as a fair method, the influence of voters over the outcome may vary. It is also possible to vote strategically to improve the results from each stakeholder's point of view. This study examines the use of social choice theory in revealing stakeholders' preferences in participatory forest planning, and the influence of different voters on the outcome. The positional voting rules examined were approval voting and Borda count, but both rules were slightly modified for the purposes of this study. The third rule examined, cumulative rule, resembles utilitarian voting rules. The voting rules were tested in a real participatory forest planning situation in eastern Lapland, Finland. All voting rules resulted in a different joint order of importance of the criteria. Yet, the preference orders produced had also a lot in common and the criteria could be divided into three quite distinct groups according to their importance. The influence of individual voters varied between the voting rules, and in each case different voter was the most influential.
Vainikainen
N
N
Finnish Forest Research Institute, Helsinki Unit, Unioninkatu 40 A, FIN-00170 Helsinki, Finland. nina.vainikainen@metla.fi
Kangas
A
A
Kangas
J
J
D000383:Agriculture; D003256:Community Participation; D003247:Conservation of Natural Resources / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D004784:Environmental Monitoring; D005387:Finland; D016468:Forestry / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence* / Q000379:methods*; D011057:Politics