The role of information about "convention," "design," and "goal" in representing artificial kinds.
In this chapter, we have considered the nature and development of our capacities for the representation of artificial kinds. We have presented a range of evidence collected using varying methods and from our own laboratories and those of others that speaks to the question of the kinds of information that might be central to knowledge of artifacts and their functions in human semantic memory. One key argument here has been that despite the fact that information about shared convention has been argued to play an important role in understanding of the "proper" uses of artifacts, just as it does in the case of the use of linguistic symbols within language communities, there are important differences between the two cases, and indeed across development, decisions about categories and functions dissociate. We have argued here that the nonarbitrary relationship between the material kind and mechanical structure of artifacts and the functions that can be supported undercuts the force of information about convention as important to determining proper artifact function. Shared convention appears less important for determining this facet of our semantic memory for artifacts than it does in supporting the proper relationship between linguistic symbols and the categories of artifact to which they refer.
German
Tim P
TP
Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA.
Truxaw
Danielle
D
Defeyter
Margaret Anne
MA
D003071:Cognition; D003210:Concept Formation; D003469:Culture; D006040:Goals; D006801:Humans; D011340:Problem Solving; D013672:Technology