The "bicameral mind" 30 years on: a critical reappraisal of Julian Jaynes' hypothesis.
In 1976 Julian Jaynes published his controversial book The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, introducing the hypothesis of a two-chambered brain-mind model that preceded the evolutionary development of the conscious mind. Jaynes' speculative model gave rise to a huge debate, which has reverberated throughout the current neuroscientific and neurophilosophical literature. Has the bicameral mind stood the test of time? To answer this question, the present paper adopts a multidisciplinary perspective and, after briefly summarizing Jaynes' hypothesis, addresses two main critical issues: the neurological basis of the bicameral model and the philological accuracy of Jaynes' arguments. Finally, the concept of a non-unitary Self is presented as one of the most relevant contemporary legacies of the bicameral mind.
Cavanna
Andrea Eugenio
AE
Institute of Neurology, London, UK. acavanna@ion.ucl.ac.uk
Trimble
Michael
M
Cinti
Federico
F
Monaco
Francesco
F
D005075:Biological Evolution; D001921:Brain / Q000502:physiology*; D003071:Cognition / Q000502:physiology*; D003243:Consciousness / Q000502:physiology; D007839:Functional Laterality / Q000502:physiology; D049673:History, 20th Century; D006801:Humans; D008959:Models, Neurological; D008960:Models, Psychological; D009488:Neurosciences / Q000266:history*; D011582:Psychological Theory; D012649:Self Concept