A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness.
One major problem many hypotheses regarding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC), face is what we might call "the why question": why would this particular neural feature, rather than another, correlate with consciousness? The purpose of the present paper is to develop an NCC hypothesis that answers this question. The proposed hypothesis is inspired by the cross-order integration (COI) theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness arises from the functional integration of a first-order representation of an external stimulus and a second-order representation of that first-order representation. The proposal comes in two steps. The first step concerns the "general shape" of the NCC and can be directly derived from COI theory. The second step is a concrete hypothesis that can be arrived at by combining the general shape with empirical considerations.
Kriegel
Uriah
U
Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia.
D001364:Awareness / Q000502:physiology; D002540:Cerebral Cortex / Q000502:physiology*; D003243:Consciousness / Q000502:physiology*; D004292:Dominance, Cerebral / Q000502:physiology; D006801:Humans; D008606:Mental Processes / Q000502:physiology; D010465:Perception / Q000502:physiology; D017397:Prefrontal Cortex / Q000502:physiology; D011582:Psychological Theory