Pre-reflective self-as-subject from experiential and empirical perspectives.
In the first part of this paper I characterize a minimal form of self-consciousness, namely pre-reflective self-consciousness. It is a constant structural feature of conscious experience, and corresponds to the consciousness of the self-as-subject that is not taken as an intentional object. In the second part, I argue that contemporary cognitive neuroscience has by and large missed this fundamental form of self-consciousness in its investigation of various forms of self-experience. In the third part, I exemplify how the notion of pre-reflective self-awareness can be of relevance for empirical research. In particular, I propose to interpret processes of sensorimotor integration in light of the phenomenological approach that allows the definition of pre-reflective self-consciousness.
Legrand
Dorothée
D
CREA - CNRS, 1 rue Descartes, 75005 Paris, France. legrand@shs.polytechnique.fr
D000223:Adaptation, Psychological; D001364:Awareness / Q000502:physiology*; D001828:Body Image; D003243:Consciousness / Q000502:physiology*; D006801:Humans; D007699:Kinesthesis / Q000502:physiology; D011582:Psychological Theory; D021641:Recognition, Psychology / Q000502:physiology*; D012649:Self Concept; D012647:Self-Assessment; D014473:Unconscious, Psychology