title: The deep bodily origins of the subjective perspective: models and their problems.
abstract: The naturalization of consciousness and the way a subjective perspective arises are hotly debated both in the cognitive sciences and in more strictly philosophical contexts. A number of these debates, mainly inspired by neuroscientific findings, focus on the 'visceral' dimension of the body in order to formulate a hypothesis for the coming about of consciousness. This focus on what might be called the 'in-depth body' (which is usually not governed by the intentions of the subject) shows that consciousness or the subjective perspective is intimately linked with vital and visceral regulatory processes. I join the debate by arguing that representationalist accounts of the origin of consciousness in the in-depth body exhibit a number of flaws hitherto mainly unnoticed. Furthermore, some aspects of neuroscientific theories are explored as possible validations of a nonrepresentationalist model of consciousness and the subjective perspective. Inspired by phenomenological (more specifically Husserlian) philosophy, I present a hypothesis in which the subjective perspective constitutes itself (in a process of auto-constitution) and in which the 'in-depth' body is not the object of representations in the brain. Rather, the 'in-depth body' is in a non-objectified way built-in in the subjective perspective itself. In this account, therefore, the subjective perspective looses its transparency and gains 'interoceptive thickness'.
authors.affiliation: Faculty of Fine Arts, University College Ghent, J. Kluyskensstraat 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. Helena.DePreester@hogent.be
authors.forename: Helena
authors.initials: H
authors.lastname: De Preester
mesh_terms: D000223:Adaptation, Psychological; D001364:Awareness / Q000502:physiology*; D001828:Body Image; D003243:Consciousness / Q000502:physiology*; D006801:Humans; D007699:Kinesthesis / Q000502:physiology*; D008960:Models, Psychological; D021641:Recognition, Psychology / Q000502:physiology; D012649:Self Concept; D012647:Self-Assessment