title: On how a child's awareness of thinking informs explanations of thought insertion.
abstract: Theories of thought insertion have tended to favour either the content of the putatively alien thought or some peculiarity within the experience itself as a means of explaining why the subject differentiates one thought from another in terms of personal ownership. There are even accounts that try to incorporate both of these characteristics. What all of these explanations share is the view that it is unexceptional for us to experience thought as our own. The aim of this paper is to consider the means by which this awareness of the myness of thought occurs. Why is it that I, as the subject of thought, typically experience a thought as mine? Using research which investigates the development of a child's awareness of the act of thinking, I will evaluate leading explanations of thought insertion. It is my contention that by understanding the means by which the awareness of one's ownership of thought develops, we can better assess explanations of thought insertion; and whilst, at present, no theory is fully able to explain the condition, the incorporation of developmental research suggest that we should favour one in particular.
authors.affiliation: Institute of Psychological Sciences, University of Leeds, Leeds LS29JT, UK. g.m.young@leeds.ac.uk
authors.forename: Garry
authors.initials: G
authors.lastname: Young
mesh_terms: D001364:Awareness; D002648:Child; D003071:Cognition; D006801:Humans; D013060:Speech; D013850:Thinking