title: Ambiguous games: evidence for strategic ambiguity aversion.
abstract: The problem of ambiguity in games is discussed, and a class of ambiguous games is identified. A total of 195 participants played strategic-form games of various sizes with unidentified co-players. In each case, they first chose between a known-risk game involving a co-player indifferent between strategies and an equivalent ambiguous game involving one of several co-player types, each with a different dominant strategy, and then they chose a strategy for the preferred game. Half the players knew that the ambiguous co-player types were equally likely, and half did not. Half expected the outcomes to be known immediately, and half expected a week's delay. Known-risk games were generally preferred, confirming a significant strategic ambiguity aversion effect. In the delay conditions, players who knew that the ambiguous co-player types were equally likely were significantly less ambiguity averse than those who did not. Decision confidence was significantly higher in 2 x 2 than in larger games.
authors.affiliation: School of Psychology, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK. bdp5@le.ac.uk
authors.forename: Briony D
authors.initials: BD
authors.lastname: Pulford
authors.forename: Andrew M
authors.initials: AM
authors.lastname: Colman
mesh_terms: D000328:Adult; D002755:Choice Behavior / Q000502:physiology; D003657:Decision Making / Q000502:physiology; D005260:Female; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D007721:Knowledge of Results, Psychological; D008297:Male; D012306:Risk; D013334:Students / Q000523:psychology; D013997:Time Factors; D035501:Uncertainty