Ascriptional and 'genuine' autonomy.
Knowing that human judgment can be fallible, we propose to distinguish the subjective ascription of a property, such as autonomy, from the genuine fact that an entity is characterised by a certain property, i.e., it is autonomous. In this paper, we take a closer look at this distinction and what it is grounded on, taking a constructivist stance that sees the scientist as an observing subject. We arrive at a notion of fortified ascription, in which knowledge and scientific study of generative mechanisms play an important role, and look at some models of autonomy in the light of this distinction.
Rohde
Marieke
M
COSTECH Université de Technologie de Compiègne, France. m.rohde@sussex.ac.uk
Stewart
John
J
D000818:Animals; D001185:Artificial Intelligence; D003071:Cognition / Q000502:physiology*; D006801:Humans; D033182:Intention; D019369:Life; D008954:Models, Biological; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D009626:Terminology as Topic; D014836:Volition / Q000502:physiology*