Rethinking neuroethics in the light of the extended mind thesis.
The extended mind thesis is the claim that mental states extend beyond the skulls of the agents whose states they are. This seemingly obscure and bizarre claim has far-reaching implications for neuroethics, I argue. In the first half of this article, I sketch the extended mind thesis and defend it against criticisms. In the second half, I turn to its neuroethical implications. I argue that the extended mind thesis entails the falsity of the claim that interventions into the brain are especially problematic just because they are internal interventions, but that many objections to such interventions rely, at least in part, on this claim. Further, I argue that the thesis alters the focus of neuroethics, away from the question of whether we ought to allow interventions into the mind, and toward the question of which interventions we ought to allow and under what conditions. The extended mind thesis dramatically expands the scope of neuroethics: because interventions into the environment of agents can count as interventions into their minds, decisions concerning such interventions become questions for neuroethics.
Levy
Neil
N
Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Australia. nllevy@unimelb.edu.au
D026688:Bioethical Issues; D001921:Brain; D006801:Humans; D008606:Mental Processes; D019222:Mind-Body Relations, Metaphysical; D009488:Neurosciences / Q000941:ethics*; D010684:Philosophy