title: Sortal concepts and causal continuity: comment of Rips, Blok, and Newman (2006).
abstract: L. J. Rips, S. Blok, and G. Newman (2006) proposed that singular concepts, which support the tracing of individual objects across their existence, are governed by a principle of causal continuity. They purported to show that causal continuity is better than existing theories at explaining judgments of the persistence of individual objects. This article makes 3 points. First, the construct of causal connectedness entails a wide variety of different explanatory factors; calling them all causal has questionable explanatory value. There is little evidence that the ultimate basis for identity judgments in many cases is causal. Second, the authors suggest that causal knowledge is indeed important to identity, but that it is important in the context of sortal concepts; different causal information matters for different kinds of things. Finally, the authors consider whether causal knowledge or sortal concepts are more fundamental to tracing individual identity, that is, whether causal knowledge is necessary for identity judgments. The authors appeal to research in developmental psychology that has begun to address this debate, supporting the primacy of sortal concepts. Although there continues to be shortcomings of all theories of object persistence, it is not clear that the causal continuer theory brings new clarity to the puzzle.
authors: Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, British Columbia, Canada. mijke@psych.ubc.ca
authors: Mijke
authors: M
authors: Rhemtulla
authors: Fei
authors: F
authors: Xu
mesh_terms: D003071:Cognition; D006801:Humans; D007600:Judgment; D008960:Models, Psychological; D012933:Social Identification