title: Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity.
abstract: Communication about social topics is abundant in human societies, and many functions have been attributed to such gossiping. One of these proposed functions is the management of reputations. Reputation by itself has been shown to have a strong influence on cooperation dynamics in games of indirect reciprocity, and this notion helps to explain the observed high level of cooperation in humans. Here we designed a game to test a widespread assumption that gossip functions as a vector for the transmission of social information. This empirical study (with 14 groups of nine students each) focuses on the composition of gossip, information transfer by gossip, and the behavior based on gossip information. We show that gossip has a strong influence on the resulting behavior even when participants have access to the original information (i.e., direct observation) as well as gossip about the same information. Thus, it is evident that gossip has a strong manipulative potential. Furthermore, gossip about cooperative individuals is more positive than gossip about uncooperative individuals, gossip comments transmit social information successfully, and cooperation levels are higher when people encounter positive compared with negative gossip.
authors.affiliation: Department of Evolutionary Ecology, Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306 Plön, Germany. sommerfeld@mpil-ploen.mpg.de
authors.forename: Ralf D
authors.initials: RD
authors.lastname: Sommerfeld
authors.forename: Hans-Jürgen
authors.initials: HJ
authors.lastname: Krambeck
authors.forename: Dirk
authors.initials: D
authors.lastname: Semmann
authors.forename: Manfred
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Milinski
mesh_terms: D003142:Communication; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D019370:Observation; D012919:Social Behavior