The deterrent effect of increasing fixed penalties for traffic offences: the Norwegian experience.
OBJECTIVE
Many motorized countries use fixed penalties to deter the most common traffic violations. Fixed penalties are usually given at the spot by a police officer. If the offender accepts the fixed penalty, no court hearing or trial is held. During the years 1995-2004, the rates for fixed penalties for traffic offences in Norway increased substantially. This paper evaluates the effects on compliance of these increases.


METHODS
Regression analysis was performed to determine the effects of increases in fixed penalties.


RESULTS
For speeding in general, no effect of increasing fixed penalties can be found. For speeding close to speed camera sites, there is a weak tendency for the violation rate to go down. This tendency is not statistically significant at conventional levels. For seat belt wearing, wearing rates are found to increase as fixed penalties have increased. In recent years, however, enforcement of the seat belt law has stepped up, making it impossible to separate the effect of enforcement from that of fixed penalties.


CONCLUSIONS
It has been suggested that the police may adapt to stricter penalties by reducing enforcement or by adopting larger tolerance margins for violations. Available evidence does not support this hypothesis.
Institute of Transport Economics, Gaustadalléen 21, NO-0349 Oslo, Norway. re@toi.no
Rune
R
Elvik
Peter
P
Christensen
D000063:Accidents, Traffic / Q000517:prevention & control; D001334:Automobile Driving / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence* / Q000706:statistics & numerical data*; D006801:Humans; D035846:Law Enforcement / Q000379:methods*; D009664:Norway; D010781:Photography; D016495:Police; D011678:Punishment; D011907:Rate Setting and Review; D012044:Regression Analysis; D012622:Seat Belts / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D012926:Social Control, Formal / Q000379:methods*