title: Optimal quality, waits and charges in health insurance.
abstract: We examine the role of quality and waiting time in health insurance when there is ex post moral hazard. Quality and waiting time provide additional instruments to control demand and potentially can improve the trade-off between optimal risk bearing and optimal consumption of health care. We show that optimal quality is lower than it would be in the absence of ex post moral hazard. But it is never optimal to have a positive waiting time if the marginal cost of waiting is higher for patients with greater benefits from health care.
authors.affiliation: National Primary Care Research and Development Centre, Centre for Health Economics, University of York, York YO10 5DD, United Kingdom. hg8@york.ac.uk
authors.forename: Hugh
authors.initials: H
authors.lastname: Gravelle
authors.forename: Luigi
authors.initials: L
authors.lastname: Siciliani
mesh_terms: D001294:Attitude to Health; D017047:Cost Sharing; D015276:Health Care Rationing / Q000191:economics / Q000379:methods*; D006301:Health Services Needs and Demand / Q000191:economics / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D006302:Health Services Research / Q000379:methods; D006801:Humans; D007348:Insurance, Health / Q000191:economics / Q000592:standards* / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D017059:Models, Econometric; D011787:Quality of Health Care; D020414:Risk Sharing, Financial; D013997:Time Factors