Fast and frugal heuristics are plausible models of cognition: reply to Dougherty, Franco-Watkins, and Thomas (2008).
M. R. Dougherty, A. M. Franco-Watkins, and R. Thomas (2008) conjectured that fast and frugal heuristics need an automatic frequency counter for ordering cues. In fact, only a few heuristics order cues, and these orderings can arise from evolutionary, social, or individual learning, none of which requires automatic frequency counting. The idea that cue validities cannot be computed because memory does not encode missing information is misinformed; it implies that measures of co-occurrence are incomputable and would invalidate most theories of cue learning. They also questioned the recognition heuristic's psychological plausibility on the basis of their belief that it has not been implemented in a memory model, although it actually has been implemented in ACT-R (L. J. Schooler & R. Hertwig, 2005). On the positive side, M. R. Dougherty et al. discovered a new mechanism for a less-is-more effect. The authors of the present article specify minimal criteria for psychological plausibility, describe some genuine challenges in the study of heuristics, and conclude that fast and frugal heuristics are psychologically plausible: They use limited search and are tractable and robust.
Gigerenzer
Gerd
G
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany. sekgigerenzer@mpib-berlin.mpg.de
Hoffrage
Ulrich
U
Goldstein
Daniel G
DG
D003071:Cognition; D003463:Cues; D006801:Humans; D011582:Psychological Theory; D011930:Reaction Time