Psychological plausibility of the theory of probabilistic mental models and the fast and frugal heuristics.
The theory of probabilistic mental models (PMM; G. Gigerenzer, U. Hoffrage, & H. Kleinbölting, 1991) has had a major influence on the field of judgment and decision making, with the most recent important modifications to PMM theory being the identification of several fast and frugal heuristics (G. Gigerenzer & D. G. Goldstein, 1996). These heuristics were purported to provide psychologically plausible cognitive process models that describe a variety of judgment behavior. In this article, the authors evaluate the psychological plausibility of the assumptions upon which PMM were built and, consequently, the psychological plausibility of several of the fast and frugal heuristics. The authors argue that many of PMM theory's assumptions are questionable, given available data, and that fast and frugal heuristics are, in fact, psychologically implausible.
Dougherty
Michael R
MR
Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park 20742, USA. mdougherty@psyc.umd.edu
Franco-Watkins
Ana M
AM
Thomas
Rick
R
D003657:Decision Making; D006801:Humans; D007600:Judgment; D008960:Models, Psychological; D015233:Models, Statistical