Uncertain what uncertainty monitoring monitors.
Smith et al. present a model that they suggest may clarify aspects of the phylogenetic distribution of metacognition, based on observation of what they call uncertainty monitoring. Although they suggest that their model is supported by data collected using monkeys and dolphins, their interpretation that nonhuman animal behaviors parallel thought processes in humans may be unwarranted. The model presented by Smith et al. is inconsistent with current theories and empirical findings on the comparative aspects of metacognition. We present three oversights of the model and extend our critique to include a brief discussion of animal self-awareness, as well as current neuropsychological perspectives on metacognitive processing in humans.
Wilkins
Victoria M
VM
Department of Psychology, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA 19102 Victoria.M.Wilkins@drexel.edu LeeAnn.Cardaciotto@drexel.edu Steven.M.Platek@drexel.edu.
Cardaciotto
Leeann
L
Platek
Steven M
SM