Cloning and adoption: a reply to Levy and Lotz.
In previous articles I discussed the ethics of human reproductive cloning, focusing on a possible future scenario in which reproductive cloning can be accomplished without an elevated risk of anomalies to the children who are created. I argued that in such a scenario it would be ethically permissible for infertile couples to use cloning as a way to have genetically related children and that such use should not be prohibited. In 'Reproductive Cloning and a (Kind of) Genetic Fallacy', Neil Levy and Mianna Lotz raise objections to my conclusions. They disagree with the view, for which I argued, that some couples can have defensible reasons for desiring genetically related children. They also offer several new arguments against reproductive cloning, including an argument that it would diminish the number of adoptions, thereby adversely affecting the welfare of children who need to be adopted. In this paper I point out that Levy and Lotz's criticisms misconstrue my arguments and that there are serious problems with their arguments for prohibiting infertile couples from using cloning, including their argument from adoption.
Strong
Carson
C
Department of Human Values and Ethics, College of Medicine, 956 Court Avenue, Suite B324, Memphis TN 38163, USA. cstrong@utmem.edu
D000300:Adoption; D019976:Cloning, Organism / Q000941:ethics*; D026689:Ethical Analysis; D006801:Humans; D012099:Reproductive Techniques / Q000941:ethics*