title: Moral intuition: its neural substrates and normative significance.
abstract: Philosophers use the phrase "moral intuition" to describe the appearance in consciousness of moral judgments or assessments without any awareness of having gone through a conscious reasoning process that produces this assessment. This paper investigates the neural substrates of moral intuition. We propose that moral intuitions are part of a larger set of social intuitions that guide us through complex, highly uncertain and rapidly changing social interactions. Such intuitions are shaped by learning. The neural substrates for moral intuition include fronto-insular, cingulate, and orbito-frontal cortices and associated subcortical structure such as the septum, basil ganglia and amygdala. Understanding the role of these structures undercuts many philosophical doctrines concerning the status of moral intuitions, but vindicates the claim that they can sometimes play a legitimate role in moral decision-making.
authors.affiliation: Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 101-40, California Institute of Technology 1200 E California Blvd. Pasadena, CA 91125, USA.
authors.forename: James
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Woodward
authors.forename: John
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Allman
mesh_terms: D004644:Emotions; D028663:Ethical Theory; D006801:Humans; D019545:Intuition / Q000502:physiology*; D007858:Learning; D009014:Morals; D009446:Neurobiology; D011582:Psychological Theory; D012945:Social Values