title: The strategic interaction between firms and formulary committees: effects on the prices of new drugs.
abstract: We study the strategic interaction between the pricing decisions of a pharmaceutical firm and the reimbursement decisions of a government agency which grants reimbursement rights to patients for whom new drugs are most cost-effective. If the reimbursement decision precedes pricing, the agency only reimburses some patients if the drug's private and public health benefits diverge. This is, there are consumption externalities and the variable cost of the drug exceeds the alternative's. Contrarily, if the firm can commit to a price before reimbursement, a strategic effect implies that by setting a sufficiently high price, the firm can make the agency more willing to reimburse than without commitment.
authors.affiliation: Department of Economics, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, UK. mcg@kent.ac.uk
authors.forename: María D C
authors.initials: MD
authors.lastname: García-Alonso
authors.forename: Begoña
authors.initials: B
authors.lastname: García-Mariñoso
mesh_terms: D003362:Cost-Benefit Analysis; D003659:Decision Making, Organizational; D004345:Drug Industry; D015507:Drugs, Investigational / Q000191:economics*; D006801:Humans; D017059:Models, Econometric; D010606:Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee; D012051:Reimbursement Mechanisms; D014481:United States
chemical_list: D015507:Drugs, Investigational