title: Curbing industry sponsor's incentive to design post-approval trials that are suboptimal for informing prescribers but more likely than optimal designs to yield favorable results.
authors: Benjamin P
authors: BP
authors: Falit
mesh_terms: D002985:Clinical Protocols; D017327:Clinical Trials, Phase IV as Topic / Q000191:economics; D000529:Complementary Therapies; D003362:Cost-Benefit Analysis; D004305:Dose-Response Relationship, Drug; D017277:Drug Approval; D004345:Drug Industry / Q000191:economics; D064420:Drug-Related Side Effects and Adverse Reactions; D015981:Epidemiologic Factors; D005378:Financial Support; D005569:Formularies as Topic; D033161:Government Regulation; D006801:Humans; D007255:Information Services; D019458:Insurance Coverage; D007356:Insurance, Pharmaceutical Services; D009042:Motivation; D016134:Organizational Policy; D010043:Outcome and Process Assessment, Health Care; D018579:Patient Selection; D010818:Practice Patterns, Physicians'; D017149:Private Sector; D011358:Product Surveillance, Postmarketing; D017150:Public Sector; D017594:Publication Bias; D011786:Quality Control; D044469:Racial Groups; D012107:Research Design; D012720:Severity of Illness Index; D013997:Time Factors; D014481:United States; D014486:United States Food and Drug Administration