The Central Dogma as a thesis of causal specificity.
I present a reconstruction of F.H.C. Crick's two 1957 hypotheses 'Sequence Hypothesis' and 'Central Dogma' in terms of a contemporary philosophical theory of causation. Analyzing in particular the experimental evidence that Crick cited, I argue that these hypotheses can be understood as claims about the actual difference-making cause in protein synthesis. As these hypotheses are only true if restricted to certain nucleic acids in certain organisms, I then examine the concept of causal specificity and its potential to counter claims about causal parity of DNA and other cellular components. I first show that causal specificity is a special kind of invariance under interventions, namely invariance of generalizations that range over finite sets of discrete variables. Then, I show that this notion allows the articulation of a middle ground in the debate over causal parity.
Weber
Marcel
M
SNF-Förderungsprofessur Wissenschaftsphilosophie, Programm für Wissenschaftsforschung, Missionsstrasse 21, 4003 Basel, Switzerland.
D015984:Causality; D015509:Developmental Biology / Q000266:history*; D034462:Dissent and Disputes; D015870:Gene Expression; D005786:Gene Expression Regulation; D005815:Genetic Code; D014644:Genetic Variation; D049673:History, 20th Century; D006801:Humans; D008967:Molecular Biology / Q000266:history*; D014176:Protein Biosynthesis; D012641:Selection, Genetic