title: Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity.
abstract: The idea of evolutionary game theory is to relate the payoff of a game to reproductive success (= fitness). An underlying assumption in most models is that fitness is a linear function of the payoff. For stochastic evolutionary dynamics in finite populations, this leads to analytical results in the limit of weak selection, where the game has a small effect on overall fitness. But this linear function makes the analysis of strong selection difficult. Here, we show that analytical results can be obtained for any intensity of selection, if fitness is defined as an exponential function of payoff. This approach also works for group selection (= multi-level selection). We discuss the difference between our approach and that of inclusive fitness theory.
authors.affiliation: Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA. traulsen@evolbio.mpg.de
authors.forename: Arne
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Traulsen
authors.forename: Noam
authors.initials: N
authors.lastname: Shoresh
authors.forename: Martin A
authors.initials: MA
authors.lastname: Nowak
mesh_terms: D000465:Algorithms; D019143:Evolution, Molecular; D005716:Game Theory; D005828:Genetics, Population; D008957:Models, Genetic; D012641:Selection, Genetic; D013269:Stochastic Processes