The phenomenological underpinning of the notion of a minimal core self: a psychological perspective.
The paper argues that Zahavi's defence of the self as an experiential dimension, i.e. "identified with the first-person givenness of experiential phenomena", and of the notion of a pre-reflective minimal core self relies on an unwarranted assumption. It is assumed that awareness of the phenomenal mode of experiences of objects, i.e. what the object "feels" like for the experiencer, is comparable with, indeed entails, first-person givenness of experience. In consequence both the arguments concerning the foundational role of the pre-reflective minimal core self and the explanation of the unity and identity of the self through time give rise to intractable problems.
Praetorius
Nini
N
Department of Psychology, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark. nini.praetorius@psy.ku.dk
D001364:Awareness; D003243:Consciousness; D006801:Humans; D011582:Psychological Theory; D012649:Self Concept