Self-referential emotions.
The aim of this paper is to examine a special subgroup of emotion: self-referential emotions such as shame, pride and guilt. Self-referential emotions are usually conceptualized as (i) essentially involving the subject herself and as (ii) having complex conditions such as the capacity to represent others' thoughts. I will show that rather than depending on a fully fledged 'theory of mind' and an explicit language-based self-representation, (i) pre-forms of self-referential emotions appear at early developmental stages already exhibiting their characteristic structure of the intentional object of the emotion being identical with or intricately related to the subject experiencing the emotional state and that (ii) they precede and substantially contribute to the development of more complex representations and to the development of a self-concept, to social interaction and to ways of understanding of other minds.
Zinck
Alexandra
A
Institut für Philosophie, Universitätsstrasse 150, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 44801 Bochum, Germany. alexandra.zinck@rub.de
D003071:Cognition; D006167:Guilt; D006801:Humans; D008960:Models, Psychological; D012649:Self Concept; D012752:Shame