title: Modularity and the social mind: are psychologists too self-ish?
abstract: A modular view of the mind implies that there is no unitary "self" and that the mind consists of a set of informationally encapsulated systems, many of which have functions associated with navigating an inherently ambiguous and competitive social world. It is proposed that there are a set of cognitive mechanisms--a social cognitive interface (SCI)--designed for strategic manipulation of others' representations of one's traits, abilities, and prospects. Although constrained by plausibility, these mechanisms are not necessarily designed to maximize accuracy or to maintain consistency with other encapsulated representational systems. The modular view provides a useful framework for talking about multiple phenomena previously discussed under the rubric of the self.
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA. kurzban@psych.upenn.edu
authors.forename: Robert
authors.initials: R
authors.lastname: Kurzban
authors.forename: C Athena
authors.initials: CA
authors.lastname: Aktipis
mesh_terms: D006801:Humans; D009790:Occupations; D011584:Psychology; D012649:Self Concept; D012933:Social Identification; D012938:Social Perception; D012945:Social Values