title: Market entry decisions: effects of absolute and relative confidence.
abstract: In a market entry game, the number of entrants usually approaches game-theoretic equilibrium quickly, but in real-world markets business start-ups typically exceed market capacity, resulting in chronically high failure rates and suboptimal industry profits. Excessive entry has been attributed to overconfidence arising when expected payoffs depend partly on skill. In an experimental test of this hypothesis, 96 participants played 24 rounds of a market entry game, with expected payoffs dependent partly on skill on half the rounds, after their confidence was manipulated and measured. The results provide direct support for the hypothesis that high levels of confidence are largely responsible for excessive entry, and they suggest that absolute confidence, independent of interpersonal comparison, rather than confidence about one's abilities relative to others, drives excessive entry decisions when skill is involved.
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey. fergus@bilkent.edu.tr
authors.forename: Fergus
authors.initials: F
authors.lastname: Bolger
authors.forename: Briony D
authors.initials: BD
authors.lastname: Pulford
authors.forename: Andrew M
authors.initials: AM
authors.lastname: Colman
mesh_terms: D000293:Adolescent; D000328:Adult; D000368:Aged; D001076:Aptitude; D032882:Comprehension; D003469:Culture; D003657:Decision Making; D016520:Entrepreneurship; D005260:Female; D005717:Games, Experimental; D006801:Humans; D008297:Male; D040541:Marketing; D008875:Middle Aged; D009042:Motivation; D011337:Probability Learning; D011340:Problem Solving; D012309:Risk-Taking; D012649:Self Concept