title: Differentiating shame from guilt.
abstract: How does shame differ from guilt? Empirical psychology has recently offered distinct and seemingly incompatible answers to this question. This article brings together four prominent answers into a cohesive whole. These are that (a) shame differs from guilt in being a social emotion; (b) shame, in contrast to guilt, affects the whole self; (c) shame is linked with ideals, whereas guilt concerns prohibitions and (d) shame is oriented towards the self, guilt towards others. After presenting the relevant empirical evidence, we defend specific interpretations of each of these answers and argue that they are related to four different dimensions of the emotions. This not only allows us to overcome the conclusion that the above criteria are either unrelated or conflicting with one another, it also allows us to tell apart what is constitutive from what is typical of them.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva, 2 rue de Candolle, 1205 Geneva, Switzerland. Fabrice.Teroni@lettres.unige.ch
authors.forename: Fabrice
authors.initials: F
authors.lastname: Teroni
authors.forename: Julien A
authors.initials: JA
authors.lastname: Deonna
mesh_terms: D000339:Affect; D006167:Guilt; D006801:Humans; D012649:Self Concept; D012660:Semantics; D012752:Shame; D012919:Social Behavior