title: Experts' agency problems: evidence from the prescription drug market in Japan.
abstract: This article examined the physician-patient agency relationship in the context of the prescription drug market in Japan. In this market, physicians often both prescribe and dispense drugs and can pocket profits in so doing. A concern is that, due to the incentive created by the mark-up, physicians' prescription decisions may be distorted. Empirical results using anti-hypertensive drugs suggest that physicians' prescription choices are influenced by the mark-up. However, physicians are also sensitive to the patient's out-of-pocket costs. Overall, although the mark-up affects prescription choices, physicians appear more responsive to the patient's out-of-pocket costs than their own profits from mark-up.
authors.forename: Toshiaki
authors.initials: T
authors.lastname: Iizuka
mesh_terms: D000959:Antihypertensive Agents / Q000191:economics; D016265:Conflict of Interest / Q000191:economics*; D003365:Costs and Cost Analysis / Q000191:economics; D016527:Drug Costs; D004345:Drug Industry / Q000191:economics*; D011307:Drug Prescriptions / Q000191:economics*; D004363:Drug Utilization; D017850:Economics, Pharmaceutical; D019981:Health Care Sector; D006801:Humans; D007356:Insurance, Pharmaceutical Services; D007564:Japan; D018803:Models, Economic; D010817:Physician-Patient Relations; D010818:Practice Patterns, Physicians' / Q000191:economics*; D011306:Prescription Fees
chemical_list: D000959:Antihypertensive Agents