The scope and limits of enactive approaches to visual experience.
I pursue here three related aims. First, I criticise some of the metaphysical claims made on behalf of the so-called 'enactive' approach to visual experience. Secondly, I explain why the enactive view of visual experience is hard to square with the evidence in favour of the two-visual-systems model of human vision. Finally, I explore one possible way to develop the 'pre-emptive perception' framework and explain why, contrary to first appearances, some of the fundamental discoveries of brain mechanisms, whose function might be to underlie pre-emptive perception, do not really support the enactive approach to visual experience.
Jacob
Pierre
P
Institut Jean Nicod, UMR 8129, EHESS/ENS-DEC/CNRS, F 75007 Paris, France. jacob@ehess.fr
D001921:Brain / Q000502:physiology*; D006801:Humans; D008960:Models, Psychological; D009068:Movement / Q000502:physiology; D014785:Vision, Ocular / Q000502:physiology*; D014795:Visual Pathways / Q000502:physiology; D014796:Visual Perception / Q000502:physiology*