A performance estimate for the detection of undeclared nuclear-fuel reprocessing by atmospheric 85Kr.
To test the sensitivity of using atmospheric (85)Kr to detect undeclared separation of plutonium from irradiated nuclear-reactor fuel, measurements of atmospheric (85)Kr taken in Tsukuba, Japan are analyzed to determine: (1) a lower limit of detection for discovering anthropogenic (85)Kr emissions, (2) the probability of detecting plutonium separation at the Tokai Reprocessing Plant, and (3) the extent to which these results can be generalized to other sites. A LLD of at least 3.4 sigma=0.14 Bq/m(3) with a theoretical false-positive rate of 0.05% is recommended for safeguards' purposes. At this threshold, the continuous separation of 100, 300, and 900 g equivalent weapon-grade plutonium per day was found to correspond to 10%, 50%, and 80% probability of detection, respectively. The smallest detected concentration was for the continuous separation of 45 g/day, with a probability of detection of about 0.6%. It was found that the detection rate is determined predominantly by the weather.
Kemp
R Scott
RS
Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, 221 Nassau Street, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA. rskemp@princeton.edu
Schlosser
C
C
D001272:Atmosphere; D005189:False Positive Reactions; D007727:Krypton Radioisotopes / Q000032:analysis*; D009688:Nuclear Reactors; D011336:Probability; D012680:Sensitivity and Specificity
D007727:Krypton Radioisotopes