Human reproductive cloning and reasons for deprivation.
Human reproductive cloning provides the possibility of genetically related children for persons for whom present technologies are ineffective. I argue that the desire for genetically related children is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to engage in human reproductive cloning. I show this by arguing that the value underlying the desire for genetically related children implies a tension between the parent and the future child. This tension stems from an instance of a deprivation and violates a general principle of reasons for deprivation. Alternative considerations, such as a right to procreative autonomy, do not appear helpful in making the case for human reproductive cloning merely on the basis of the desire for genetically related children.
Jensen
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DA
Brigham Young University, 4093 JFSB, Department of Philosophy, Provo, UT 84604, USA. davidj@byu.edu
D026688:Bioethical Issues / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence; D019976:Cloning, Organism / Q000941:ethics* / Q000523:psychology; D004992:Ethics, Medical; D005260:Female; D005818:Genetic Engineering / Q000941:ethics*; D006801:Humans; D007246:Infertility / Q000628:therapy*; D008297:Male; D009042:Motivation; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D011247:Pregnancy; D027724:Reproductive Techniques, Assisted / Q000941:ethics*