To wait or to pay for medical treatment? Restraining ex-post moral hazard in health insurance.
We explore the hierarchy of two instruments, waiting time and coinsurance for medical treatment, for optimally solving the tradeoff between the economic gains from risk sharing and the losses from moral hazard. We show that the optimal waiting time is zero, given that the coinsurance rate is optimally set.
Felder
Stefan
S
Duisburg-Essen University, Department of Economics, 45117 Essen, Germany. stefan.felder@uni-due.de
D000465:Algorithms; D003669:Deductibles and Coinsurance; D003695:Delivery of Health Care; D006801:Humans; D007348:Insurance, Health / Q000191:economics*; D009014:Morals; D012051:Reimbursement Mechanisms / Q000941:ethics / Q000458:organization & administration*; D020414:Risk Sharing, Financial; D013997:Time Factors