title: The special status of actions in causal reasoning in rats.
abstract: A. P. Blaisdell, K. Sawa, K. J. Leising, and M. R. Waldmann (2006) reported evidence for causal reasoning in rats. After learning through Pavlovian observation that Event A (a light) was a common cause of Events X (an auditory stimulus) and F (food), rats predicted F in the test phase when they observed Event X as a cue but not when they generated X by a lever press. Whereas associative accounts predict associations between X and F regardless of whether X is observed or generated by an action, causal-model theory predicts that the intervention at test should lead to discounting of A, the regular cause of X. The authors report further tests of causal-model theory. One key prediction is that full discounting should be observed only when the alternative cause is viewed as deterministic and independent of other events, 2 hallmark features of actions but not necessarily of arbitrary events. Consequently, the authors observed discounting with only interventions but not other observable events (Experiments 1 and 2). Moreover, rats were capable of flexibly switching between observational and interventional predictions (Experiment 3). Finally, discounting occurred on the very first test trial (Meta-Analysis). These results confirm causal-model theory but refute associative accounts.
authors: Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA.
authors: Kenneth J
authors: KJ
authors: Leising
authors: Jared
authors: J
authors: Wong
authors: Michael R
authors: MR
authors: Waldmann
authors: Aaron P
authors: AP
authors: Blaisdell
mesh_terms: D000818:Animals; D001070:Appetitive Behavior; D001245:Association Learning; D003210:Concept Formation; D003214:Conditioning, Classical; D003463:Cues; D003657:Decision Making; D005260:Female; D011939:Mental Recall; D009042:Motivation; D011340:Problem Solving; D051381:Rats; D020318:Rats, Long-Evans; D011931:Reactive Inhibition; D012718:Set, Psychology; D014163:Transfer, Psychology