The special status of actions in causal reasoning in rats.
A. P. Blaisdell, K. Sawa, K. J. Leising, and M. R. Waldmann (2006) reported evidence for causal reasoning in rats. After learning through Pavlovian observation that Event A (a light) was a common cause of Events X (an auditory stimulus) and F (food), rats predicted F in the test phase when they observed Event X as a cue but not when they generated X by a lever press. Whereas associative accounts predict associations between X and F regardless of whether X is observed or generated by an action, causal-model theory predicts that the intervention at test should lead to discounting of A, the regular cause of X. The authors report further tests of causal-model theory. One key prediction is that full discounting should be observed only when the alternative cause is viewed as deterministic and independent of other events, 2 hallmark features of actions but not necessarily of arbitrary events. Consequently, the authors observed discounting with only interventions but not other observable events (Experiments 1 and 2). Moreover, rats were capable of flexibly switching between observational and interventional predictions (Experiment 3). Finally, discounting occurred on the very first test trial (Meta-Analysis). These results confirm causal-model theory but refute associative accounts.
Leising
Kenneth J
KJ
Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA.
Wong
Jared
J
Waldmann
Michael R
MR
Blaisdell
Aaron P
AP
D000818:Animals; D001070:Appetitive Behavior; D001245:Association Learning; D003210:Concept Formation; D003214:Conditioning, Classical; D003463:Cues; D003657:Decision Making; D005260:Female; D011939:Mental Recall; D009042:Motivation; D011340:Problem Solving; D051381:Rats; D020318:Rats, Long-Evans; D011931:Reactive Inhibition; D012718:Set, Psychology; D014163:Transfer, Psychology