Mental models and the suppositional account of conditionals.
The mental model theory of conditional reasoning presented by P. N. Johnson-Laird and R. M. J. Byrne (2002) has recently been the subject of criticisms (e.g., J. St. B. T. Evans, D. E. Over, & S. J. Handley, 2005). The authors argue that the theoretical conflict can be resolved by differentiating 2 kinds of reasoning, reasoning about possibilities given the truth of assertions and reasoning about the truth of assertions given possibilities. The standard mental model theory accounts for the former kind of reasoning but does not adequately account for the latter, contrary to the suppositional approach favored by J. St. B. T. Evans et al. (2005). The authors thus propose a modified mental model theory of conditionals that reconciles the 2 theoretical approaches. It is demonstrated that this theory is able to explain the key findings that have been opposed to the standard theory by J. St. B. T. Evans et al. and makes new predictions that are empirically verified.
Barrouillet
Pierre
P
Faculté de Psychologie et des Sciences de l'Education, Université de Genève, Switzerland. Pierre.Barrouillet@pse.unige.ch
Gauffroy
Caroline
C
Lecas
Jean-François
JF
D000328:Adult; D002648:Child; D003071:Cognition; D003657:Decision Making; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D008297:Male; D011582:Psychological Theory; D013998:Time Perception