Intelligent tit-for-tat in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game.
We seek a route to the equilibrium where all the agents cooperate in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game on a two-dimensional plane, focusing on the role of tit-for-tat strategy. When a time horizon, within which a strategy can recall the past, is one time step, an equilibrium can be achieved as cooperating strategies dominate the whole population via proliferation of tit-for-tat. Extending the time horizon, we filter out poor strategies by simplified replicator dynamics and observe a similar evolutionary pattern to reach the cooperating equilibrium. In particular, the rise of a modified tit-for-tat strategy plays a central role, which implies how a robust strategy is adopted when provided with an enhanced memory capacity.
Baek
Seung Ki
SK
Department of Physics, BK21 Physics Research Division, and Institute of Basic Science, Sungkyunkwan University, Suwon, Korea.
Kim
Beom Jun
BJ