The role of representation in computation.
Reformers urge that representation no longer earns its explanatory keep in cognitive science, and that it is time to discard this troublesome concept. In contrast, we hold that without representation cognitive science is utterly bereft of tools for explaining natural intelligence. In order to defend the latter position, we focus on the explanatory role of representation in computation. We examine how the methods of digital and analog computation are used to model a relatively simple target system, and show that representation plays an in-eliminable explanatory role in both cases. We conclude that, to the extent that biologic systems engage in computation, representation is destined to play an explanatory role in cognitive science.
O'Brien
Gerard
G
Philosophy, School of Humanities, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia. gerard.obrien@adelaide.edu.au
Opie
Jon
J
D000465:Algorithms; D001185:Artificial Intelligence; D003071:Cognition / Q000502:physiology*; D019336:Cognitive Science / Q000379:methods*; D003198:Computer Simulation / Q000592:standards / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D006801:Humans; D008960:Models, Psychological; D016571:Neural Networks, Computer; D011582:Psychological Theory
Cogn Process. 2006 Mar;7(1):30-41
16628464