End-of-life decision-making, the principle of double effect, and the devil's choice: a response to Roger Magnusson.
Recently, the principle of double effect has come under scrutiny by Magnusson who believes it provides a subterfuge for those who act so as to end the lives of their patients. Specifically, he argues that the conceptual distinction between foresight and intention is dubious and, moreover, renders patients vulnerable to involuntary euthanasia. At the same time, Magnusson wants to protect doctors from criminal liability when faced with (what he understands to be) a "devil's choice" between ending the life of a patient or under-treating pain. Hence, Magnusson proposes that, subject to specific conditions, a so-called "defence of necessity" be recognised through either common law doctrine or legislation. However, to safeguard this defence, he must rely on what he most wants to reject: a fundamental aspect of the principle of double effect.
McCabe
Helen
H
Plunkett Centre for Ethics in Health Care, Sydney. h.mccabe@plunkett.acu.edu.au
D003657:Decision Making; D034723:Double Effect Principle; D026689:Ethical Analysis; D006801:Humans; D010166:Palliative Care / Q000941:ethics*