title: Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation.
abstract: Much of human cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle. Unlike other animals, people frequently cooperate with non-relatives in large groups. Evolutionary models of large-scale cooperation require not just incentives for cooperation, but also a credible disincentive for free riding. Various theoretical solutions have been proposed and experimentally explored, including reputation monitoring and diffuse punishment. Here, we empirically examine an alternative theoretical proposal: responsibility for punishment can be borne by one specific individual. This experiment shows that allowing a single individual to punish increases cooperation to the same level as allowing each group member to punish and results in greater group profits. These results suggest a potential key function of leadership in human groups and provides further evidence supporting that humans will readily and knowingly behave altruistically.
authors.affiliation: Psychology Group, Sheffield Hallam University, Collegiate Crescent Campus, Sheffield S10 2BP, UK. rogorman@alumni.binghamton.edu
authors.forename: Rick
authors.initials: R
authors.lastname: O'Gorman
authors.forename: Joseph
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Henrich
authors.forename: Mark
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Van Vugt
mesh_terms: D000533:Altruism; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005260:Female; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D007857:Leadership; D008297:Male; D011156:Population Density; D011157:Population Dynamics; D011678:Punishment / Q000523:psychology*