Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism.
Recently, there has been an increased interest in folk intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility from both philosophers and psychologists. We aim to extend our understanding of folk intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility using an individual differences approach. Building off previous research suggesting that there are systematic differences in folks' philosophically relevant intuitions, we present new data indicating that the personality trait extraversion predicts, to a significant extent, those who have compatibilist versus incompatibilist intuitions. We argue that identifying groups of people who have specific and diverse intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility offers the possibility for theoretical advancement in philosophy and psychology, and may in part explain why some perennial philosophical debates have proven intractable.
Feltz
Adam
A
Department of Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies, Schreiner University, Kerrville, TX 78028, USA. adfeltz@schreiner.edu
Cokely
Edward T
ET
D005610:Freedom; D006801:Humans; D019545:Intuition; D007600:Judgment; D010551:Personality; D011582:Psychological Theory; D012649:Self Concept; D012938:Social Perception; D012941:Social Responsibility; D011795:Surveys and Questionnaires