title: Representing metarepresentations: is there theory of mind-specific cognition?
abstract: What cognitive mechanisms underlie Theory of Mind? Some infer domain-specific Theory of Mind cognition based the pattern of children diagnosed with autism failing the False Belief test but passing the False Photograph test. However, we argue that the False Belief test entails various task demands the False Photograph task does not, including the necessity to represent a higher-order representation (a metarepresentation), thus confounding the inference of domain-specificity. Instead, a general difficulty that affects representations of metarepresentations might account for the seeming domain-specific failure. Here we find that False-Belief failing False-Photograph passing children fail the Meta Photograph test, a new photograph-domain test that requires subjects to represent a metarepresentation. We conclude that people who fail the False Belief test but pass the False Photograph test do not necessarily have a content-specific Theory of Mind deficit. Instead, the general ability to represent representations and metarepresentations might underlie Theory of Mind.
authors.affiliation: Department of Radiology & Center for Autism Research,The Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA. egeth@chop.edu
authors.forename: Marc
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Egeth
authors.forename: Robert
authors.initials: R
authors.lastname: Kurzban
mesh_terms: D001321:Autistic Disorder / Q000453:epidemiology; D002648:Child; D003071:Cognition; D003072:Cognition Disorders / Q000175:diagnosis / Q000453:epidemiology; D003469:Culture; D006801:Humans; D033182:Intention; D009483:Neuropsychological Tests; D010641:Phenotype; D011582:Psychological Theory