title: A modified no-fault malpractice system can resolve multiple healthcare system deficiencies.
abstract: Medical professional liability in the United States, as measured by total premiums paid by physicians and healthcare facilities, costs approximately $30 billion a year in direct expenses, less than 2% of the entire annual healthcare expenditures. Only a fraction of those dollars reach patients who are negligently injured. Nonetheless, the tort system has far-reaching effects that create substantial indirect costs. Medical malpractice litigation is pervasive and physicians practice defensively to avoid being named in a suit. Those extra expenditures provide little value to patients. Despite an elaborate existing tort system, patient safety remains a vexing problem. Many injured patients are denied access to timely, reasonable remedies. We propose a no-fault system supplemented by a variation of the traditional tort system whereby physicians are incentivized to follow evidence-based guidelines. The proposed system would guarantee a substantial decrease in, but not elimination of, litigation. The system would lower professional liability premiums. Injured patients would ordinarily be compensated with no-fault disability and life insurance proceeds. To the extent individual physicians pose a recurrent danger, their care would be reviewed on an administrative level. Savings would be invested in health information technology and purchase of insurance coverage for the uninsured. We propose a financial model based on publicly accessible sources.
authors.affiliation: Medical Justice Services, Inc., PO Box 49669, Greensboro, NC 27419, USA. jsegal@medicaljustice.com
authors.forename: Jeffrey J
authors.initials: JJ
authors.lastname: Segal
authors.forename: Michael
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Sacopulos
mesh_terms: D003675:Defensive Medicine / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D003695:Delivery of Health Care / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence; D018166:Health Care Reform / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence; D007351:Insurance, Liability / Q000191:economics; D008318:Malpractice / Q000191:economics / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D017146:Models, Organizational; D009010:Monte Carlo Method; D014481:United States