Looking for episodic memory in animals and young children: prospects for a new minimalism.
Because animals and young children cannot be interrogated about their experiences it is difficult to conduct research into their episodic memories. The approach to this issue adopted by Clayton and Dickinson [Clayton, N. S., & Dickinson, A. (1998). Episodic-like memory during cache recovery by scrub jays. Nature, 395, 272-274] was to take a conceptually minimalist definition of episodic memory, in terms of integrating information about what was done where and when [Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving, & W. Donaldson (Eds.), Organisation of memory (pp. 381-403). New York: Academic Press], and to refer to such memories as 'episodic-like'. Some claim, however, that because animals supposedly lack the conceptual abilities necessary for episodic recall one should properly call these memories 'semantic'. We address this debate with a novel approach to episodic memory, which is minimalist insofar as it focuses on the non-conceptual content of a re-experienced situation. It rests on Kantian assumptions about the necessary 'perspectival' features of any objective experience or re-experience. We show how adopting this perspectival approach can render an episodic interpretation of the animal data more plausible and can also reveal patterns in the mosaic of developmental evidence for episodic memory in humans.
Clayton
Nicola S
NS
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, Downing Street, Cambridge, UK. nsc22@cam.ac.uk
Russell
James
J
D000818:Animals; D001522:Behavior, Animal / Q000502:physiology*; D002648:Child; D002657:Child Development; D002675:Child, Preschool; D006801:Humans; D008568:Memory / Q000502:physiology*