title: On feelings as a heuristic for making offers in ultimatum negotiations.
abstract: This research examined how reliance on emotional feelings as a heuristic influences how offers are made. Results from three experiments using the ultimatum game show that, compared with proposers who do not rely on their feelings, proposers who rely on their feelings make less generous offers in the standard ultimatum game, more generous offers in a variant of the game allowing responders to make counteroffers, and less generous offers in a dictator game in which no responses are allowed. Reliance on feelings triggers a more literal form of play, whereby proposers focus more on how they feel toward the content of the offers than on how they feel toward the possible outcomes of those offers, as if the offers were the final outcomes. Proposers who rely on their feelings also tend to focus on gist-based construals of the negotiation that capture only the essential aspects of the situation.
authors.affiliation: Columbia University, Graduate School of Business, New York, NY 10025, USA.
authors.forename: Andrew T
authors.initials: AT
authors.lastname: Stephen
authors.forename: Michel Tuan
authors.initials: MT
authors.lastname: Pham
mesh_terms: D001288:Attention; D003210:Concept Formation; D003469:Culture; D003657:Decision Making; D004644:Emotions; D005717:Games, Experimental; D006801:Humans; D019545:Intuition; D009042:Motivation; D017008:Negotiating; D011337:Probability Learning; D035501:Uncertainty