Feedback produces divergence from prospect theory in descriptive choice.
A recent study demonstrated that individuals making experience-based choices underweight small probabilities, in contrast to the overweighting observed in a typical descriptive paradigm. We tested whether trial-by-trial feedback in a repeated descriptive paradigm would engender choices more correspondent with experiential or descriptive paradigms. The results of a repeated gambling task indicated that individuals receiving feedback underweighted small probabilities, relative to their no-feedback counterparts. These results implicate feedback as a critical component during the decision-making process, even in the presence of fully specified descriptive information. A model comparison at the individual-subject level suggested that feedback drove individuals' decision weights toward objective probability weighting.
Jessup
Ryan K
RK
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Program in Cognitive Science, Indiana University, USA. ryan.jessup@gmail.com
Bishara
Anthony J
AJ
Busemeyer
Jerome R
JR
D001288:Attention; D002755:Choice Behavior; D003469:Culture; D003657:Decision Making; D030141:Feedback, Psychological; D005715:Gambling / Q000523:psychology*; D006801:Humans; D009042:Motivation; D011337:Probability Learning; D018794:Problem-Based Learning; D012309:Risk-Taking