Evolutionary matrix games and optimization theory.
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is only required to be capable of resisting invasion by rare mutant strategies. In contrast, an absolute invader strategy (AIS) is a rare mutant strategy that can invade any established strategy. We show that the predictions of the outcome of evolution made by optimization models are compatible with those made by the classical expected payoff comparisons in matrix games. We also show that if a matrix game has an AIS that AIS is unique and is also an ESS. But an ESS need not be an AIS. In pure-strategy submodels, an AIS need not be unique. An AIS of a matrix game has global asymptotic stability property in the game dynamics which involve only pure strategies including the AIS.
Apaloo
J
J
Department of Mathematics, Statistics and Computer Science, St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, Nova Scotia, Canada B2G 2W5. japaloo@stfx.ca
D000465:Algorithms; D000818:Animals; D005075:Biological Evolution; D005716:Game Theory; D008957:Models, Genetic; D009154:Mutation