A simple scaling of the effectiveness of supporting mutual cooperation in donor-recipient games by various reciprocity mechanisms.
In donor-recipient games (DRG), one of the sub-classes of Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), it is well-known that a game structure is described by two parameters benefit (b) and cost (c) of cooperation. By means of a series of numerical experiments, we proved that the effectiveness of supporting mutual cooperation in DRG by various reciprocity mechanisms can be expressed in a single game structural parameter, b/c. This also implies that the dilemma strength in various donor-recipient games with various reciprocity mechanisms can be evaluated only by b/c, which is consistent with the previous novel finding by Nowak. It was also discussed whether this kind of parameterization idea can be extended to general games in PD game class.
Tanimoto
Jun
J
Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka, Japan. tanimoto@cm.kyushu-u.ac.jp
D005075:Biological Evolution; D003198:Computer Simulation; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D003657:Decision Making / Q000502:physiology*; D005716:Game Theory; D008954:Models, Biological; D011157:Population Dynamics