title: Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood.
abstract: We highlight the latest research on body perception and self-consciousness, but argue that despite these achievements, central aspects have remained unexplored, namely, global aspects of bodily self-consciousness. Researchers investigated central representations of body parts and actions involving these, but neglected the global and unitary character of self-consciousness, the 'I' of experience and behaviour. We ask, what are the minimally sufficient conditions for the appearance of a phenomenal self, that is, the fundamental conscious experience of being someone? What are necessary conditions for self-consciousness in any type of system? We offer conceptual clarifications, discuss recent empirical evidence from neurology and cognitive science and argue that these findings offer a new entry point for the systematic study of global and more fundamental aspects of self-consciousness.
authors.affiliation: Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland. olaf.blanke@epfl.ch
authors.forename: Olaf
authors.initials: O
authors.lastname: Blanke
authors.forename: Thomas
authors.initials: T
authors.lastname: Metzinger
mesh_terms: D001828:Body Image; D003243:Consciousness; D006801:Humans; D007088:Illusions; D008960:Models, Psychological; D012649:Self Concept