title: The multiple self objection to the prudential lifespan account.
abstract: Multiple self approaches purport that to have equal concern about all stages of one's life is not a requirement of rationality. This poses a challenge to the prudential lifespan account which Norman Daniels advocates in Just health: meeting health needs fairly. Daniels has criticised the multiple self approach in earlier works, most extensively in Am I my parents keeper? In Just health, he only takes up the issue except in one footnote, presumably because he is convinced that his preceding discussions settled the matter. This article argues that Daniels underestimates the force of the multiple self objection to prudential lifespan account.
authors.affiliation: Universität St Gallen, Kulturwissenschaftliche Abteilung, Gatterstr 1, CH-9010 St Gallen. michael.schefczyk@unisg.ch
authors.forename: M
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Schefczyk
mesh_terms: D000367:Age Factors; D000368:Aged; D000369:Aged, 80 and over; D003695:Delivery of Health Care / Q000191:economics / Q000941:ethics*; D005260:Female; D015276:Health Care Rationing / Q000941:ethics*; D006801:Humans; D008017:Life Expectancy; D008297:Male; D011788:Quality of Life / Q000523:psychology; D012935:Social Justice / Q000941:ethics*; D012941:Social Responsibility; D012959:Socioeconomic Factors