Life and death in Freudian metapsychology: a reappraisal of the second instinctual dualism.
In this paper we re-examine the second instinctual dualism hypothesis introduced by Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. We suggest that the life instinct hypothesis as something opposed to the death instinct does not seem to fit into this theory easily. On the other hand, death instinct turns out to be an internal necessity of Freudian metapsychological theory from the beginning of Freud's metapsychological writing. We shall argue, based on the ideas formulated in Beyond the Pleasure Principle and in later metapsychological texts, that Freud could not wholly justify the existence of an opposition and a symmetry between the two classes of instincts. Even though up to his last works Freud held on to this instinctual dualism, again and again his arguments lead to the idea that the life instincts should be regarded, ultimately, as death instincts.
Caropreso
Fátima
F
Universidade Estadual de Campinas e Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná, Caixa Postal 14, São Carlos, São Paulo, 13560-970, Brazil. fatimacaropreso@uol.com.br
Simanke
Richard Theisen
RT
D001293:Attitude to Death; D005619:Freudian Theory; D006801:Humans; D007323:Instinct; D019369:Life