Beyond perceptual symbols: a call for representational pluralism.
Recent evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that certain cognitive processes employ perceptual representations. Inspired by this evidence, a few researchers have proposed that cognition is inherently perceptual. They have developed an innovative theoretical approach that rests on the notion of perceptual simulation and marshaled several general arguments supporting the centrality of perceptual representations to concepts. In this article, I identify a number of weaknesses in these arguments and defend a multiple semantic code approach that posits both perceptual and non-perceptual representations.
Dove
Guy
G
Department of Philosophy, 313B Humanities Building, University of Louisville, College of Arts and Sciences, Louisville, KY 40292, USA. guy.dove@louisville.edu
D003071:Cognition / Q000502:physiology*; D003198:Computer Simulation; D006801:Humans; D008568:Memory / Q000502:physiology; D008960:Models, Psychological; D010465:Perception / Q000502:physiology*; D011578:Psycholinguistics; D012660:Semantics