Stochastic sampling of interaction partners versus deterministic payoff assignment.
Evolutionary game dynamics describes how successful strategies spread in a population. In well-mixed populations, the usual assumption, e.g. underlying the replicator dynamics, is that individuals obtain a payoff from interactions with a representative sample of the population. This determines their fitness. Here, we analyze a situation in which payoffs are obtained through a single interaction, so that individuals of the same type can have different payoffs. We show analytically that for weak selection, this scenario is identical to the usual approach in which an individual interacts with the whole population. For strong selection, however, differences arise that are reflected in the fixation probabilities and lead to deviating evolutionary dynamics.
Woelfing
Benno
B
Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Str. 2, 24306 Plön, Germany. woelfing@evolbio.mpg.de
Traulsen
Arne
A
D000818:Animals; D005075:Biological Evolution; D005716:Game Theory; D008957:Models, Genetic; D011157:Population Dynamics; D012641:Selection, Genetic; D013269:Stochastic Processes