Therapeutic cloning and reproductive liberty.
Concern for "reproductive liberty" suggests that decisions about embryos should normally be made by the persons who would be the genetic parents of the child that would be brought into existence if the embryo were brought to term. Therapeutic cloning would involve creating and destroying an embryo, which, if brought to term, would be the offspring of the genetic parents of the person undergoing therapy. I argue that central arguments in debates about parenthood and genetics therefore suggest that therapeutic cloning would be prima facie unethical unless it occurred with the consent of the parents of the person being cloned. Alternatively, if therapeutic cloning is thought to be legitimate, this undermines the case for some uses of reproductive cloning by implying that the genetic relation it establishes between clones and DNA donors does not carry the same moral weight as it does in cases of normal reproduction.
Sparrow
Robert
R
Centre for Human Bioethics, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia. Robert.Sparrow@arts.monash.edu.au
D001315:Australia; D033421:Beginning of Human Life / Q000941:ethics; D026688:Bioethical Issues; D019976:Cloning, Organism / Q000941:ethics*; D019924:Embryo Disposition / Q000941:ethics*; D004992:Ethics, Medical; D005818:Genetic Engineering / Q000941:ethics*; D006805:Human Experimentation / Q000941:ethics*; D006801:Humans; D028681:Moral Obligations; D016487:Parenting / Q000523:psychology; D010375:Pedigree; D026684:Personal Autonomy