Preimplantation genetic diagnosis, reproductive freedom, and deliberative democracy.
In this paper I argue that the account of deliberative democracy advanced by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996, 2004) is a useful normative theory that can help enhance our deliberations about public policy in morally pluralistic societies. More specifically, I illustrate how the prescriptions of deliberative democracy can be applied to the issue of regulating non-medical uses of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), such as gender selection. Deliberative democracy does not aim to win a philosophical debate among rival first-order theories, such as libertarianism, egalitarianism or feminism. Rather, it advances a second-order analysis that strives to help us determine what would constitute a reasonable balance between the conflicting fundamental values that arise in the context of regulating PGD. I outline a theoretical model (called the Reasonable Genetic Intervention Model) that brings these issues to the fore. Such a model incorporates the concern for both procedural and substantive principles; and it does so in way that takes provisionality seriously.
Farrelly
Colin
C
Department of Political Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada. farrelly@queensu.ca
D026688:Bioethical Issues; D002170:Canada; D033041:Embryo Research / Q000941:ethics*; D005610:Freedom; D006801:Humans; D019836:Preimplantation Diagnosis / Q000941:ethics*; D011639:Public Opinion; D046269:Reproductive Rights / Q000941:ethics*; D012941:Social Responsibility; D012945:Social Values