Pay for performance in primary care in England and California: comparison of unintended consequences.
OBJECTIVE
We undertook an in-depth exploration of the unintended consequences of pay-for-performance programs In England and California.


METHODS
We interviewed primary care physicians in California (20) and England (20) and compared unintended consequences in each setting. Interview recordings were transcribed verbatim and subjected to thematic analysis.


RESULTS
Unintended consequences reported by physicians varied according to the incentive program. English physicians were much more likely to report that the program changed the nature of the office visit. This change was linked to a larger number of performance measures and heavy reliance on electronic medical records, with computer prompts to facilitate the delivery of performance measures. Californian physicians were more likely to express resentment about pay for performance and appeared less motivated to act on financial incentives, even in the program with the highest rewards. The inability of Californian physicians to exclude individual patients from performance calculations caused frustration, and some physicians reported such undesirable behaviors as forced disenrollment of noncompliant patients. English physicians are assessed using data extracted from their own medical records, whereas in California assessment mostly relies on data collected by multiple third parties that may have different quality targets. Assessing performance based on these data contributes to feelings of resentment, lack of understanding, and lack of ownership reported by Californian physicians.


CONCLUSIONS
Our study findings suggest that unintended consequences of incentive programs relate to the way in which these programs are designed and implemented. Although unintended, these consequences are not necessarily unpredictable. When designing incentive schemes, more attention needs to be paid to factors likely to produce unintended consequences.
McDonald
Ruth
R
National Primary Care Research and Development Centre, The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom. ruth.mcdonald@manchester.ac.uk
Roland
Martin
M
D001291:Attitude of Health Personnel; D002140:California; D003431:Cross-Cultural Comparison; D004739:England; D054625:Healthcare Disparities; D006801:Humans; D016347:Medical Records Systems, Computerized / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D009819:Office Visits / Q000639:trends; D010349:Patient Compliance; D018579:Patient Selection; D010816:Physician Incentive Plans / Q000191:economics* / Q000458:organization & administration / Q000592:standards; D010817:Physician-Patient Relations; D010821:Physicians, Family / Q000191:economics*; D010818:Practice Patterns, Physicians' / Q000191:economics / Q000592:standards; D011320:Primary Health Care / Q000191:economics / Q000592:standards* / Q000639:trends; D017009:Professional Autonomy; D015397:Program Evaluation; D011785:Quality Assurance, Health Care / Q000191:economics* / Q000379:methods; D012052:Reimbursement, Incentive / Q000191:economics / Q000639:trends